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ROOSEVELT'S FEARLESS IDEALS—GUIDE FOR SECURITY CONFERENCE

THE bell has tolled all over the world for a man who, to an extraordinary degree, was "involved in mankind." The mourning is not for the President, who lived as full and satisfying a life as is ever granted to a human being, but for the loss to his contemporaries, young and old, of qualities always rare, and never so much needed as in the critical days ahead: courage in the face of adversity, a gay spirit, a genuine desire to understand and meet the views of other peoples, idealism made practicable by adaptability to circumstances, the daring to attempt the seemingly impossible. These qualities, which during the twelve years of his administration had come to permeate public life in this country and had deeply affected our friends and associates abroad, remain as our national heritage.

UNAFRAID OF OUR TIMES. The greatness of President Roosevelt was that, unlike many of his generation, he was unafraid of the soul-searching times in which we live. "The only limit to our realization of tomorrow," he said in a speech written the night before he died, "will be our doubts of today." Some of his opponents sincerely questioned his political and economic philosophy; others opposed all change, and criticized the President as the advocate of new deals at home and abroad. However much he may be thought to have erred on details of policies, or in administrative practices, his major achievement was his readiness to grapple with the two most crucial problems of the twentieth century: the need for orderly transition from an expansionist economy, with the emphasis on untrammelled individual initiative, to a stabilized industrial system, with the emphasis on collective responsibility for social welfare; and the parallel need to fuse the aspirations of diverse nations, at widely differing stages of development, in an international organization capable of assuring the security and welfare of all peoples.

Every country has faced these two problems. In many cases the war has merely postponed a showdown that will come the moment hostilities are over.

President Roosevelt's signal contribution to this critical transition period was the belief that necessary change could be effected by timely reforms that would revitalize democracy, making it less vulnerable to extremist doctrines of both Right and Left. What some of his opponents failed to recognize was that, without such reforms, the United States might have drifted into a condition of internal strife from which a dictatorship might have emerged. In 1933, in the depths of the depression, the President, had he wished, could have resorted to far more drastic measures than those he adopted, with the acquiescence of millions who were disoriented and frustrated by the economic crisis. Although his domestic program alarmed many people at that time, his opponents recognized in subsequent election campaigns the need for most of his reforms, which have become an accepted part of the American way of life.

Similarly; once the world was plunged in war, some critics claimed that the President had been a warmonger, while others deplored his delay in bringing the nation into the world conflict. But again, with a striking sense of what was practicable at any given time, the President, instead of pressing for immediate action, as some of the interventionists among us would have had him do, guided the nation through two critical years until a majority of the American people had become convinced of the necessity to take an active part in the war. In preparing for the establishment of a world organization, too, he took pains to lay the groundwork for acceptance by the United States of obligations under a Charter of the United Nations by seeking, in advance, the support of the Senate and encouraging wide public discussion of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. He

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died without seeing the plans for world security he had discussed with the leaders of the other United Nations brought to fulfillment at San Francisco. But there should be some satisfaction in the knowledge that he died advancing toward the goal to which all mankind aspires as the war draws to a close.

THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE. As always in the hour of death our thoughts should be less for the one who died and is at peace, and more for those who must live to carry on the struggle. President Truman has the sympathy of all his fellow-citizens as he takes up the crushing burdens of his office. He and his advisers, like President Roosevelt before him, will need the unremitting support of the entire nation to carry to a successful conclusion the prosecution of the war and the organization of the peace. It would be tragic if now, not through ill-will on any one's part, but possibly through lack of sufficient determination, the vast structure of international organization that the United Nations had just begun to build should be left unfinished; if the coalition maintained with such a remarkable degree of unity throughout the war should be allowed to disintegrate in the hour of victory. Such disintegration is the one hope that remains to Germany and Japan. But even if, as we must all see to it, this does not occur, there is always the danger that, once the pressures of war have relaxed, we will experience

the weariness and cynicism that set in after a period of extraordinary exertion. If we should then allow the dark forces of reaction, racial prejudice, economic and social strife that are latent in every society to gain the upper hand, Hitler, although defeated on the battlefield, would in effect have triumphed over democracy.

The genius of the American people—that unendingly astonishing composite of many races, creeds, political and economic beliefs—is its elasticity in hours of crisis, its unfailing spirit of fair-play, its recognition of the need to be always on the move toward new objectives. The nation's past, including the immediate past of the last twelve years which have brought the United States to the stage of maturity both in domestic and foreign affairs, should inspire us to go ahead—not shackle us in our endeavors to find answers to the problems of this century. Writing at a time when the country was in the throes of another great crisis, Walt Whitman sounded a call that remains significant today, when he said:

*"We debouch upon a newer, mightier world, varied world,
Fresh and strong the world we seize, world of labor
and the march,
Pioneers! O pioneers!"*

VERA MICHELES DEAN

GERMANY'S FUTURE HINGES ON ALLIED PLANS FOR EUROPE

Allied leaders, stunned by the sudden death of President Roosevelt, have now to meet the test of unified action in dealing with the German problem beyond the range of combined military effort against the armies of the Reich. Officials forecast protracted Nazi resistance even after the juncture of Allied armies near Berlin but, as German military power disintegrates, we are faced with the immediate issues of administering the Reich and at the same time implementing the long-term principles of the Yalta Declaration. These policies, for which President Roosevelt labored at great cost, are to be carried forward by President Truman. His address to Congress on April 16 reflects the continuity of American policy. Meanwhile, Russia has clarified its attitude toward the German people in a way that brings it closer to that of Britain and the United States. On April 14, in *Pravda*, the Communist party's official organ, the chief of the propaganda section of the party's Central Committee repudiated the stand taken by the popular writer, Ilya Ehrenburg, who has identified all Germans with their criminal fascist leaders.

GERMAN DISINTEGRATION. As our armies have pushed into Germany we have for the first time encountered large numbers of Nazi prisoners and a wide range of German civilians. No very clear picture is yet available of the mentality of these people

who have been cut off from the rest of the world during the war years. It is already apparent, however, that our main problems are the Germans' apathy and their ignorance of the issues at stake. Certainly no individual or group has risen which can either surrender to Allied authority or assume control in the German nation. These conditions constitute not only an unprecedented military problem, but challenge Allied forces to devise means of completely controlling a virtually defunct nation. Because of differences among the Allies, there has been little opportunity up to this time to define the terms of proposed policy toward Germany. Now, however, detailed plans are promptly needed.

WHAT ALLIED CONTROLS? The Central Control Commission which is to be established under the Yalta Declaration for the purpose of coordinating the joint occupation of Germany must proceed at once to weed out Nazi influence in the German state and disarm the military forces. This is no short-term undertaking but, however difficult, it is one on which there will be least disagreement. Here the April 14 statement of Russia's attitude toward the German people is pertinent. As a result, there may be less emphasis than in the past on attempts to draw distinctions between Nazis and non-Nazis in the lowest administrative ranks where Germans

must inevitably be employed in great numbers. In an atmosphere of closer understanding on this issue, it should now be possible to specify when and in what manner ranking Nazi officialdom is to be severely punished.

Whatever controls are finally imposed, it should be clear to the British and American public that extended administration will be necessary even for the minimum purpose of extirpating the Nazis and insuring disarmament. Beyond this, the Yalta prescription for the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production has already caused much debate. This calls for a long-term program on which the Allies must agree if they are to deal effectively with Germany.

Under conditions of modern warfare, no valid distinction can be made between military and economic factors. These are, in turn, intimately bound up with many extra-German questions as well, which may be adjusted when broader cooperation in economic and security matters has been achieved. Some contend that a final answer to German problems cannot be reached until the character of European reconstruction as a whole has been determined. Observers who hold these views find it lamentable that no far-reaching plans have been formulated for future economic collaboration in Europe on an international plane. Since this has not been accomplished, other spokesmen, notably the editors of the *London Economist*, insist that Germany must of necessity be treated as a national state, which is admittedly highly centralized economically, and must continue to operate on that basis in the absence of an Allied scheme for European rehabilitation and reconstruction.

BIG-THREE TESTING GROUND. The controversy over Germany suggests only the most general difficulties which lie ahead. Effective industrial control in Germany, whether specifically directed against

the production of future armaments or not, will present the most formidable challenge. In the last analysis, effective control will necessitate international supervision of scientific development in Germany. As was suggested by President Conant of Harvard last October 7, such control will require a corps of specialists. These specialists, however, will be unable to operate effectively unless the great powers have unified their policy and action with respect to Germany or other potential aggressors.

Just as scientific advance is related to industrial control or disarmament of Germany, so too these latter cut across the question of territorial occupation or division. The proposed rectification of the western Polish border agreed to at Yalta may lead to further partition of Germany. Yet recent suggestions for the establishment of an independent Rhineland state meet with the same difficulties pointed out above. For, if Germany is to be treated on the premise that settlements now devised look toward its eventual incorporation into a European system as a national state, then its territorial division at this point will only create future problems. Partition appears to be based on the premise of permanent occupation which, in turn, would seem to demand greater coordination of Allied action and far more extended commitments than either the British or American peoples are prepared to make at this time.

To suggest that the most feasible program may be a minimum program of controls does not indicate a desire to treat the German nation with less severity than is demanded. It is to be hoped that, in the interim period during which Europe generally gropes toward rehabilitation, the Allies can develop methods of collaboration with respect to Germany, where they will be in complete control, that may offer safeguards against German aggression. That this can only be accomplished within a broader security system appears obvious. Unified action, supported by broader cooperation, might then be adapted to other spheres—economic, military or territorial—where the interests of the Big Three converge.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

F.P.A. REPRESENTED AT SAN FRANCISCO

On invitation of the Secretary of State, the Foreign Policy Association has designated the president, General McCoy, as consultant to the American delegation at the San Francisco Conference. Mr. W. W. Lancaster, Chairman of the Board, and Mrs. Dean, Research Director and Editor of F.P.A. publications, will act as alternates.

What will United Nations delegates discuss at the historic April 25 meeting? Read

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
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Washington News Letter



GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS F.D.R.'s LEGACY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The late President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed on to President Harry S. Truman a legacy of great accomplishment in foreign affairs. The future will reveal whether Mr. Roosevelt had won the fundamental support of the American people for his policies, or whether his accomplishment depended on his personal powers of influence and persuasion—powers which have died with him. The Truman Administration received the legacy at the very moment when the whole future meaning of the late President's record hangs in the balance. For on April 25 the United Nations will meet in San Francisco to draw up a charter designed to carry into the coming days of peace the firm wartime coalition of which Mr. Roosevelt was the principal fashioner.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS LEGACY. The issue of world organization remains for the United States primarily a problem of the Senate rather than San Francisco, for it is the Senate that will determine whether the country effectively carries out the decisions of the conference. For this reason, the first great test of President Truman in international relations will be one of skill in domestic political affairs. He has decided to leave to diplomats and to the previously appointed United States delegation the task of working out a charter at the conference, for he does not intend to go to San Francisco. He will concentrate on the job of winning for the world organization policy the general sympathy of two-thirds of the Senators. Thirty-three Senators could kill any San Francisco charter; twenty are said to be irreconcilably opposed.

In broad outline, the nature of the foreign policy which President Roosevelt hands on is clear. Its philosophical basis was Good Neighborliness, a tolerant and helpful relationship among peoples. He stressed this point in his first inaugural on March 4, 1933, and he returned to it in his final composition, the brief talk prepared for delivery on Jefferson Day, April 13, 1945, which went unspoken. In the coalition, this philosophy was put into practice as Good Neighborliness among friends for the common purpose of overwhelming the bad neighbors, the common enemy. Tolerant compromise has been a key to the working of the coalition.

Good Neighborliness generally marked the approach to international economic questions. By the Trade Agreements Act, first passed in 1934, the Roosevelt Administration inaugurated a policy

against economic discrimination, for the Act not only embodied an attack on the American tariff structure but fostered equal commercial opportunity for all states. In 1944 Mr. Roosevelt extended the practice of Good Neighborliness in economic affairs by sponsoring the Bretton Woods Conference, which produced a program for international financial sharing to ease the flow of international commerce, and to enhance the fiscal stability of the various countries on whose prosperity the United States in obvious measure depends for its stability.

MANY DETAILS UNSOLVED. Yet Mr. Roosevelt did not leave the course of foreign relations well charted for his successor. The details of political policy with respect to many individual countries and areas (aside from Latin America) are unclear. President Truman will bear the burden of participating in original decisions about our ultimate policy toward China, which presents a difficult issue in the divergence between the central government and the régime in the northern provinces; toward the Near Eastern countries, where President Roosevelt in February established a personal friendship with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia while, at the same time, expressing sympathy for Zionist aspirations in Palestine which Ibn Saud opposes; and toward Europe, where conflicts impend between Russian, British and French views which the United States must grapple with if it is to remain an effective world power.

The absence of an elaborate apparatus of policy is due to the recent emergence of the United States in the world arena. During the first years of his Administration, President Roosevelt concerned himself but slightly with world political affairs. In 1933 he dashed the hopes of the World Economic Conference. The isolationist Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937 received only his perfunctory criticism. But with the coming of the war, Mr. Roosevelt began to put his whole emphasis on foreign affairs and prepare the United States for a place in the world conflict and an active post-war role in the community of nations—first, by persuading Congress in 1939 to amend the Neutrality Act; second, in 1941, by persuading Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act; third, in 1942, by setting up the United Nations alliance. He saw correctly that the security of the United States depends on the security of our neighbors, who are all the peoples of the globe.

BLAIR BOLLES

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